Verification and Examination Management of Complex Systems by Ruud, Stian Knud & Skjetne, Roger
Modeling, Identification and Control, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2014, pp. 333–346, ISSN 1890–1328
Verification and Examination Management of
Complex Systems
Stian Ruud 1 Roger Skjetne 2
1Section for Control Systems, DNV GL, N-1322 Høvik, Norway, E-mail: stian.ruud@dnvgl.com
2Department of Marine Technology, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, N-7491 Trondheim, Norway.
E-mail: roger.skjetne@ntnu.no
Abstract
As ship systems become more complex, with an increasing number of safety-critical functions, many
interconnected subsystems, tight integration to other systems, and a large amount of potential failure
modes, several industry parties have identified the need for improved methods for managing the verification
and examination efforts of such complex systems. Such needs are even more prominent now that the marine
and offshore industries are targeting more activities and operations in the Arctic environment. In this
paper, a set of requirements and a method for verification and examination management are proposed for
allocating examination efforts to selected subsystems. The method is based on a definition of a verification
risk function for a given system topology and given requirements. The marginal verification risks for the
subsystems may then be evaluated, so that examination efforts for the subsystem can be allocated. Two
cases of requirements and systems are used to demonstrate the proposed method. The method establishes
a systematic relationship between the verification loss, the logic system topology, verification method
performance, examination stop criterion, the required examination effort, and a proposed sequence of
examinations to reach the examination stop criterion.
Keywords: Verification management; Verification risk; Audit planning; Audit risk; Complex technical
systems
1 Introduction
With the accelerated evolution of information and com-
munication technology, the maritime industries have
experienced in a short amount of time a significant
change from conventional mechanical ships to modern
computer-controlled ships. Ship system technology has
to some extent developed and been taken into use faster
than corresponding verification methods. In (Skjetne
and Sørensen, 2004) a consortium of maritime indus-
try partners expressed a need for further research to
describe the experienced problems related to increased
computer-based integration and software problems. As
an answer to this, the need for managing the verifica-
tion and examination efforts were identified by the in-
dustry in the years 2005-2010 by, for instance, DNV,
Kongsberg Maritime, Statoil, Farstad, Marine Cyber-
netics, and Global Maritime during the development
of advanced verification and certification methods for
complex ship systems (such as DP systems), resulting
among others in the DNV GL Recommended Prac-
tice (DNV, 2012). An example of a more advanced
verification method in the maritime industry is the
industry-established Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) sim-
ulation method (Skjetne and Egeland, 2006), which
makes it possible to generate many more detailed and
low-level test cases compared to the traditional Failure
Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) testing of redun-
dant ship systems. The reason for this, as explained
by Skjetne and Egeland (2006), is that the HIL test
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tool makes many more software and hardware func-
tions testable in the target test system, that is, more
functions are controllable (can be trigged and manip-
ulated) and observable (the function behaviors can be
observed and measured) by this test tool.
Besides control systems, also offshore operations are
becoming more complex as new extreme frontiers are
challenged. For instance, the reduced sea-ice extent
in the Arctic due to global warming in recent years
has provided new industrial opportunities. The ship-
ping industry together with the Arctic countries has
initiated development and increased use of the North-
erns Sea Route for more efficient transportation from
Europe to Asia. The offshore industry has shown an
increased interest in integrated offshore operations for
petroleum activities in Arctic ice-covered waters. Such
operations are technically and physically more chal-
lenging than conventional open-water operations due
to remoteness and general lack of infrastructure, low
temperatures, darkness, and the presence of sea-ice and
icebergs. Stationkeeping operations by position moor-
ing (PM) or dynamic positioning (DP) are, as an ex-
ample, challenging since ice forces are much stronger
and rapidly varying compared to conventional open-
water environmental forces, and the technical control
systems have not been developed for the Arctic cli-
mate and ice loads. Despite this fact, it is said that
the risk of offshore activities in the Arctics should not
be higher than in the North Sea. Assuming then that
consequences of an accident is higher in an ecological
sensitive Arctic area, this means that the probability
of an incidents must be reduced by additional techni-
cal and operational barriers. It follows from this that
improved management of examination and verification
methods of the new barriers is needed.
The new situation in computer-based control sys-
tems and more operations in extreme environments
have raised some concerns, such as:
• The new system topologies are more integrated
on a ship-wide scale and become more complex.
The physical component topologies are well speci-
fied and can be assumed to be known for the veri-
fiers, while software and computer-based commu-
nication topologies are not.
• The number of operational modes and combina-
tions of user-allowed settings of the systems are
increasing.
• Larger integrated operations in sensitive environ-
ments, like in the Arctics, require a better overall
assessment of integrated functions, systems, and
barriers against operational failure. Vessels should
be verified as an integrated part of a larger system.
• There is a need for explicit assessment of the appli-
cable failure modes, that is, to identify potential
failure modes and to determine a relevant subset
to verify while discriminating other failure modes.
• The potential verification scope of software func-
tionality is very large, where the functionality is
not specified in detail, and the inter-dependencies
between software functions are unclear.
• There is a need to select the optimal sequence
of examinations, to define adequate verification
methods and sufficient quantities of examinations,
under the assumption and general acceptance that
verification cannot require complete coverage of
all possible examinations. Hence, selection of the
most beneficial examination method for a given
requirement is needed.
• The system topologies or requirements structures
may influence the need for examination effort, the
selection of verification method, and the verifica-
tion result.
In (Skjetne and Sørensen, 2004) it is stated that
many different verification methods now exist for use in
an industrial context, where testing by HIL simulation
is one example of a verification method. Application of
each such method require significant costs, especially
if testing is to happen at sea trial for a vessel or within
the Arctic environment. This further emphasizes the
need for better management of verification.
Based on the above described situation, the indus-
try partners of the project leading to (Skjetne and
Sørensen, 2004) expressed a need for further research
to obtain a more general understanding of how to de-
scribe and estimate verification contributions, and how
to optimally put together a verification portfolio for a
vessel or a system. In, for instance, the context of ship
systems or integrated power systems, different types
of representation and visual presentation of complex
systems should be studied, and precise definitions of
verification benefits should be proposed. Such defini-
tions may then be used to collect empirical informa-
tion about properties and relevance of existing verifi-
cation methods and activities, for instance, standards
like IEC 61508 (IEC, 2010), ISO 9000 types of assess-
ments, class rules, certification, approval, manufactur-
ing surveys, FMEAs, HIL simulation, software quality
assurance techniques, dock trials, sea trials, field trials,
and annual trials.
Given that sufficient knowledge related to the bene-
fits of verification methods for various types of compo-
nents or systems is established, the industry asks for
a systematic approach to verification management. A
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key issue in verification management is to find meth-
ods for allocation and sequencing different verification
activities (traditional surveys, FMEAs, HIL, and other
methods) in different parts of the lifecycle of the ship or
system. To achieve this, relationships between system
complexities, operational modes, verification volumes,
and verification confidence levels must be studied, in-
cluding the possible need to set limits on how complex
systems can be built in order to ensure sustainable de-
velopment with verification within reasonable use of
resources.
In financial audits, the auditors are applying audit
risk concepts in their planning of audits. The audit
planning and the proposed verification management
are in general representing the same type of consid-
erations and parameters to be used for allocating ex-
amination resources as proposed in this paper. In the
text box below are given brief quotes of the main con-
cepts relating to the financial audit planning and audit
risk (Arens et al., 2006; AICPA, 2006).
Audit risk Audit risk (AR) is the risk that the au-
ditor may unknowingly fail to appropriately modify
his or her opinion on financial statements that are
materially misstated.
The model AR = RMM ×DR expresses the general
relationship of audit risk, the risks associated with the
auditor’s assessments of risk of material misstate-
ment (RMM) (inherent and control risks), and the
detection risk (DR).
Risk of material misstatement Risk of material
misstatement (RMM) is the product of inherent risk
(IR) and control risk (CR).
Control risk Control risk (CR) is the risk that a
misstatement that could occur in a relevant asser-
tion and that could be material, either individually or
when aggregated with other misstatements, will not be
prevented or detected on a timely basis by the entity’s
internal control.
Detection risk Detection risk (DR) is the risk that
the auditor will not detect a misstatement that exists
in a relevant assertion that could be material, either
individually or when aggregated with other misstate-
ments. Detection risk is a function of the effective-
ness of an audit procedure and of its application by
the auditor. Detection risk cannot be reduced to zero
because the auditor does not examine 100 percent of
an account balance or a class of transactions and be-
cause of other factors.
The objectives of this article are to explain the in-
dustrial need for examination and verification manage-
ment of complex systems, and then to propose a novel
method for verification and examination management
based on industrial needs and some concepts and prac-
tices found in financial auditing.
The proposed method will be demonstrated through
two case studies on how to manage the quantity and
sequence of examination activities on subsystem level
in order to reach an acceptable level of verification risk.
The first case is one requirement to give a decision if
the specified examination should be carried out. The
second case illustrates verification management for a
redundant system with a common component.
2 Problem formulation
2.1 The verification management approach
We define verification according to (IEC, 2010) as
“confirmation by examination and provision of objec-
tive evidence that the requirements have been fulfilled”.
Figure 1: Illustration of the verification process.
We consider a verification on a system – subsystem –
component level, where the system is constructed by a
set of subsystems {A,B,C, . . .}, and each subsystem is
constructed by a set of components that all must func-
tion for the subsystem to function. The overall require-
ment is typically related to some main mode or sys-
tem function (e.g. stationkeeping mode for a DP sys-
tem) or an operation (e.g. Ice Management operation
for an Arctic offshore operation). Correspondingly, we
assume there is an overall requirement Y represent-
ing the overall system function. This is constructed
by a set of main requirements {HA, HB , HC , . . .} cor-
responding to subsystems. Each main requirement
HA is again constructed by a set of subrequirements
{hA1, hA2, hA3, . . .} on component level.
Verification management (VM) is proposed for cost-
efficient verification of the overall system requirement
Y . This involves establishing a system verification loss
L, examination methods for each main requirement, an
examination stop criterion Z for the overall verification
process, and a decision rule of the verification result.
Finally, VM must apply the decision rule for conclud-
ing the verification result – which is the result of the
verification activity.
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Examination management (EM) is a part of the ver-
ification management process. The examination man-
agement is to decide on zero examination effort or se-
lect a sequence of examination efforts {xA, xB , xC , . . .}
by corresponding methods for the main requirements
by means of an estimate of the verification risk Ψ sub-
ject to minimization.
Figure 2: Verification and examination management.
Based on the background situation and industry
needs a method for examination management is pro-
posed, including the following main elements:
• A system is represented by an overall require-
ment Y . This is constructed by a set of main
requirements, represented by the vector H =
(HA, HB , HC , . . .), through a Boolean structure
function Y = Φ(H).
• Each main requirement Hj , j = A,B,C, . . ., is as-
sumed constructed from a set of subrequirements
Hj = {hj1, hj2, hj3, . . .} that all must be satisfied
for the corresponding main requirement to be sat-
isfied, i.e. Hj = hj1 ∧ hj2 ∧ hj3 ∧ . . ..
• Each subrequirement hji and each main require-
ment Hj take a state value (True) if the require-
ment is ‘compliant’, and (False) if the requirement
is ‘noncompliant’.
• Based on previous experience, statistics, or conser-
vative estimates, we assume a priori (before exam-
ination; denoted by subscript 0) knowledge of the
probability pc0,Hj = P (Hj) that requirement Hj is
compliant. Conversely, we assume the probability
pnc0,Hj = P (¬Hj) that Hj is noncompliant.
• The examination of a main requirement Hj is char-
acterised by the subset of ‘examined subrequire-
ments’ Ej(xj) ⊆ Hj and the subset of ‘unexam-
ined subrequirements’ Uj(xj) ⊆ Hj , where xj is
some examination effort for Hj .
• For the overall verification activity there is a stop
criterion Z for stopping further examination (Z is
a Boolean expression).
• To the overall requirement Y is associated a po-
tential loss L due to potentially wrong verification
result (for instance that a noncompliant require-
ment is accepted).
Note the distinction between the main requirement
Hj , which is a scalar Boolean state variable, and the
set Hj that merely lists the “set of subrequirements”
that Hj is constructed from. The restriction that all
subrequirements in Hj must be compliant (true) for
Hj to be compliant (true) means that we can relate
the logical outcome of Hj to the “size” of the subset in
Hj with equivalent outcome.
2.2 Illustrating example to clarify the
concepts
Consider the situation where a forklift shall either be
accepted or rejected by the buyer. The machine shall
be accepted if the requirement Y is complied with.
Assume that there is given an a priori probability
pc0,Y = P (Y ) that the requirement Y is complied with,
and conversely pnc0,Y = P (¬Y ) that the requirement is
not complied with.
The buyer is offered the possibility to carry out a
verification and examination effort x, and this exam-
ination will clarify for certain if the requirements are
complied with or not. The value of the machine is L,
and in the case that the buyer accepts the machine,
he has to pay the value L of the machine. This means
that if the forklift is accepted without examination, the
possible loss may be L for the buyer.
Figure 3: The buyer of the forklift may examine the
forklift before accepting or rejecting it.
We will revisit this example in the first case study in
order to demonstrate the detailed steps of the verifica-
tion management method.
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2.3 Abbreviations and notations
Boolean operators are ∧ for logical AND, ∨ for logi-
cal OR, and ¬ for negation. In addition we have the
following nomenclature:
• A,B,C, . . .: Applied names of subsystems.
• hji: Subrequirements for the subsystem j =
A,B,C, . . ., i = 1, 2, . . . ,Mj , typically represent-
ing components or functions. Each subrequire-
ment is assumed statistically mutually indepen-
dent and takes a state value ‘True’ if the require-
ment is compliant, and ‘False’ if it is noncompli-
ant.
• Hj : Main requirements, j = A,B,C, . . ., con-
structed by a series of subrequirements. Each
main requirement takes a state value ‘True’ if the
requirement is compliant and ‘False’ if it is non-
compliant. All main requirements are collected in
a state vector H = (HA, HB , HC , . . .).
• Y : Overall system requirement constructed by a
Boolean structure function of main requirements
Y = Φ(H).
• Hj : Set of subrequirements for Hj , j =
A,B,C, . . ., for instance HA = {hA1, hA2, hA3}.
• Hcj : The subset of subrequirements, Hcj ⊆ Hj ,
that are compliant.
• Hncj : The subset of subrequirements, Hncj ⊆ Hj ,
that are noncompliant. This gives Hcj∪Hncj = Hj .
• xj : Examination effort by means of an examina-
tion method for requirement Hj . We collect all
efforts into a vector x = (xA, xB , xC , . . .).
• Ej(xj): Examined set of subrequirements for Hj
as a function of examination effort xj . Note:
Ej(xj) ⊆ Hj .
• ej(xj): Scalar measure of examined sub-
requirements in Hj . We collect all ex-
amination functions into a vector e(x) =
(eA(xA), eB(xB), eC(xC), . . .).
• Uj(xj): Unexamined set of subrequirements for
Hj as a function of examination effort xj . Note:
Uj(xj) ⊆ Hj , Ej(xj) ∪ Uj(xj) = Hj , and Ej(xj) ∩
Uj(xj) = ∅.
• uj(xj): Scalar measure of unexamined subrequire-
ments in Hj . We collect all the functions into a
vector u(x) = (uA(xA), uB(xB), uC(xC), . . .).
• L: The loss which may follow as a consequence of
wrong verification decision for requirement Y .
• Ψ(x): Verification risk for the system requirement
Y . Initial verification risk is denoted Ψ0.
• ∂Ψ∂xj : Sensitivity of verification risk Ψ with respect
to effort xj for the respective verification method.
• pc0,Hj , pnc0,Hj : a priori probability pc0,Hj = P (Hj)
and pnc0,Hj = P (¬Hj) before examination work,
where pc0,Hj + p
nc
0,Hj
= 1.
• Z: Examination stop criterion, assumed to take a
logic value (true or false).
Note that scripted notation is used for sets of re-
quirements, e.g. H, E , and U . If we in the text discuss
a single main requirement, we typically use j = A and
HA (without loss of generality). In most of the paper,
this is the case.
3 Proposed examination and
verification management method
Verification or examination management shall recom-
mend if and how much examination effort x one should
perform before accepting or rejecting conformance to
the given requirement Y . We make the assumptions:
• Subsystems, components, and examination of sub-
requirements are assumed to be statistically mu-
tually independent.
• In a complex system consisting of a number of sub-
systems (A,B,C, . . .) the examination is assumed
to be performed at the subsystem level and the re-
sult of the examination can be aggregated to the
top system level by means of standard risk and
reliability methods. All requirements are possible
to be examined.
• If all subrequirements are examined and thus all
main requirements verified, then a completely cor-
rect verification decision will be made for Y . This
assumes that a selected verification method gives
perfect certainty of compliance if performed.
• An examination of a requirement shall establish
the state of the requirement, being either compli-
ant or non-compliant.
• The state of a requirement is assumed to be un-
changed due to an examination effort. This im-
plies that examination must be nondestructive.
We note, however, that for some types of exam-
ination the testing may influence the state of the
equipment to be improved or possibly to become
worse (destructive testing).
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• In the case that a noncompliant requirement is
identified by the examination, it has to be decided
if the state of the requirement (or the component)
should be fixed, or if the state shall remain non-
compliant as identified.
Note that the verification risk will be the same in
both cases if the noncompliant requirement is restored
or not, since verification risk is only related to the
knowledge of the requirement’s state for making the
correct verification decision.
3.1 Requirements and outcome of
verification decision
The overall requirement Y may be a single require-
ment, Y = HA, or a complex Boolean expression
containing a number of requirements. This is gen-
erally represented by a Boolean structure function
Y = Φ(H), e.g. Y = Φ(H) = (HA ∨ HB) ∧ HC .
Each main requirement HA is constructed by a se-
ries of subrequirements to be satisfied, that is, HA =
hA1 ∧ hA2 ∧ hA3 ∧ . . ..
The corresponding set of subrequirements, e.g.
HA = {hA1, hA2, hA3}, may originate from standards,
class rules, recommended practices, functional specifi-
cations, or be agreed between the user of the verifica-
tion result and the verifier.
The verifier’s task is then to decide on an examina-
tion scope for the requirements, perform the planned
examinations, and thereby provide evidence for accept-
ing or rejecting the requirements. To be able to make
a decision regarding whether to accept or reject the
requirement, the verifier must choose a sufficient set
of examinations. Since the main requirement HA log-
ically needs all respective subrequirements to be com-
pliant, a scope of examinations of the subrequirements
is needed. The examination may include verification of
the complete set of subrequirements in HA, a subset of
HA, or no examination at all. The outcome of such a
process may in principle be four different scenarios, as
indicated in Figure 4:
1. HA is actually true and verifier accepts require-
ments: Right decision, green box.
2. HA is actually true but verifier rejects require-
ments: Wrong decision, yellow box, Type I error.
3. HA is actually false but verifier accepts require-
ments: Wrong decision, red box, Type II error.
4. HA is actually false and verifier rejects require-
ments: Right decision, green box.
Figure 4: Possible outcomes of verification decision.
3.2 Verification loss
In this paper the outcome that a wrong verification de-
cision, by accepting a noncompliant requirement, is de-
noted as a Type II error, which is similar to the termi-
nology used in hypothesis testing (NIST/SEMATECH,
2014). Obviously, the critical requirements are those
that in reality are noncompliant and unexamined, that
is, those in the set HncA ∩ UA(xA).
Verification loss L is the worst-case loss that may
follow as a result of a wrong verification decision for a
Type II error. L is the consequence of the verification
decision for a given stakeholder (owner, yard, verifier,
etc.) in the case that requirement Y is wrongly ac-
cepted in the verification decision. This value should
be established by the verifier together with the stake-
holders applying the verification result. The loss due
to a Type I error is assumed smaller and, thus, not
considered in this paper.
The verification loss parameter L may be described
by consequence classes related to, for instance:
• Fatalities/injuries from accidents.
• Environmental consequences (pollution).
• Loss of facilities.
• Income losses due to operational unavailability.
• System operational risk; risk without barriers or
risk with barriers.
• Insurance coverage.
The idea in this context is to assume that the verifi-
cation loss L can be established upfront the verification
work and be given as a prerequisite for the verification
and examination management. At the start of the veri-
fication, no examination work x has been done and the
potential verification loss is L.
For a given loss value L, a conservative definition of
overall verification risk Ψ can be proposed as:
Ψ = L. (1)
In this paper only the potential loss of a Type II error
is considered, but it is possible to include more error
types and loss effects.
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In the conservative definition of the verification risk
it is assumed that no effects of a priori knowledge, or
examination, or other effects (degradation) have been
taken into account in the estimate Ψ. Compared to
a normal risk equation, this definition assumes by its
conservative nature that the a priori probability of Y
being noncompliant (false) is equal to 1.
3.3 A priori probability of state of
requirement
In most cases the verification manager has some pre-
sumed and possibly conservative a priori information
about the expected (probable) outcome of an examina-
tion of HA. The verifier may decide to not perform any
examination and only base the verification decision on
the a priori probability pc0,HA = P (HA). Another gen-
eral assumption for verification and examination man-
agement is that exhaustive examination of a complex
system and complex requirements is often not possi-
ble. This means that the practical verification results
may only be possible based on a partial examination
or no examination at all. Another situation is when
the requirement HA consists of many subrequirements
{hA1, hA2, hA3, . . .}, where the verifier must evaluate
which subrequirement that shall be given the highest
examination priority and which shall be given less ef-
fort.
We assume that the set of subrequirements can be
divided into a set of compliant requirements HcA and
a set of noncompliant requirements HncA , as illustrated
in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Illustration of the set of subrequirements
HA= HcA ∪ HncA for the main requirement
HA. The a priori assumed initial state of HA
could be given by the estimated probabilities
P (HA) = p
c
0,HA
and P (¬HA) = pnc0,HA . This
is used for initiating the verification and ex-
amination management process.
There is then a need for describing some a priori
knowledge of the initial (or unexamined) state of the
requirements. This a priori information is given as a
probability that the requirement HA is initially com-
pliant, that is,
pc0,HA = P (HA) = P (HcA) (2)
where the initial estimate could, for instance, be that
pc0,HA = 0.5. Conversely, the a priori information
could be given as the probability of HA being non-
compliant, that is,
pnc0,HA = P (¬HA) = P (HncA )
= P (HA)− P (HcA) = 1− pc0,HA . (3)
We let Φca be the algebraic function relating the prob-
abilities of the main requirements H being compliant
to the probability of the Boolean function Y = Φ(H)
being compliant. Equivalently, we let Φnca relate the
probabilities of the main requirements H being non-
compliant to Y being noncompliant. This is simply
obtained by the substitutions
P (Ha ∧Hb) = P (Ha)P (Hb) (4)
P (Ha ∨Hb) = P (Ha) + P (Hb)− P (Ha)P (Hb) (5)
P (¬Ha) = 1− P (Ha) . (6)
Then we get
pc0,Y = P (Y ) = P (Φ(H)) = Φ
c
a(p
c
0,H) (7)
pnc0,Y = P (¬Y ) = P (¬Φ(H)) = Φnca (pnc0,H), (8)
where p∗0,H = (p
∗
0,HA
, p∗0,HB , p
∗
0,HC
, . . .).
Based on the specified verification loss and a priori
given probabilities, we propose to estimate the a priori
verification risk as a fraction of the verification loss by
Ψ0 = L · P (¬Y ) = L · pnc0,Y = L · Φnca (pnc0,H). (9)
This means that initially with no examination (x = 0),
the verification risk is equal to the risk of the overall
system requirement Y being noncompliant.
3.4 Examination of requirements
In a verification and examination activity the verifier
will normally examine the specified sets of require-
ments HA,HB ,HC , . . . before concluding the verifica-
tion decision (accept/reject) for Y . For each main re-
quirement HA, the examined set of subrequirements
is expressed by EA(xA), which grows with increasing
examination effort xA. The unexamined part is the
set UA(xA) of subrequirements that have not yet been
examined. This set decreases with increasing examina-
tion effort xA. It follows that HA= EA(xA) ∪ UA(xA)
and EA(xA) ∩ UA(xA) = ∅ as illustrated in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: The set HA of subrequirements is divided
into examined and unexamined require-
ments. Initially, all requirements in HA are
unexamined such that UA(0) = HA and
EA(0) = ∅. When effort xA is increased,
the set EA(xA) will grow and UA(xA) will
decrease.
At the start of the examination (xA = 0) the ex-
amination status of the requirement HA is ‘not ex-
amined’. Let a scalar characteristics function uA(xA)
describe how the unexamined set UA(x) decreases for
increasing examination effort, that is, uA(xA) ∈ [0, 1]
with uA(0) = 1 and uA(xA) = 0 when the require-
ment HA has been completely examined – in which case
UA(xA) = ∅. Similarly, we define the scalar character-
istics function eA(xA) to describe how the set EA(xA)
grows with increased examination effort. Without loss
of generality, we let eA(xA) ∈ [0, 1] with eA(0) = 0 and
eA(xA) = 1 when the requirement HA has been com-
pletely examined. We choose uA(xA) and eA(xA) such
that uA(xA) + eA(xa) = 1.
Figure 7: A requirement is unexamined uA(0) = 1
(or eA(0) = 0) for xA = 0 and examined
eA(xA) = 1 (or uA(xA) = 0) at xA = x1.
For complex systems and complex requirements, ex-
haustive examinations of all requirements and subre-
quirements can in practice not be accomplished as the
costs of the examinations will typically be too large
compared to the possible benefits. To quantity suf-
ficient examinations of the requirements in order to
make the verification process cost-efficient is the key
result to be established by the verification and exami-
nation management process.
Figure 8: Examples of functions for unexamined parts
of H. Such curves may be relevant and appli-
cable for complex requirements (upper curve
could e.g. be HIL, while the lower curve
could be FMEA).
The characteristics function uA(xA) may take dif-
ferent shapes. If, for instance, a single test can verify
the status of a single requirement HA, then u(xA) may
take the shape illustrated in Figure 7. If HA is con-
structed by a series of subrequirements, then uA(x)
may take the form of a staircase function linearly step-
ping down from one towards zero as all subrequirement
are tested. However, typically a requirement will con-
sist of a large number of subrequirements, each subre-
quirement will possibly need several tests, examination
will have an initial cost and need preparations, and re-
sults will need post-analysis. Thus, uA(xA) will more
generally be characterized by some curve as illustrated
in Figure 8.
Correspondingly, we assume that the characteristics
function uA(xA) describing the examination of a re-
quirement HA is a continuous function that monoton-
ically decreases with increasing examination effort xA.
An important assumption made, is that if uA(xA) =
0 and the verifier has completely examined the set of
requirements HA, then the verification decision will
always be correct – either accepting or rejecting HA
(green boxes outcome in Figure 4). This means that
the intended effect of increased examination is to re-
duce the number of unexamined subrequirements that
may lead to a verification loss; see Figure 9. However,
since some examinations (efforts) will give larger ver-
ification risk reduction than others, it is important in
verification and examination management to prioritize
the examinations based on cost-benefit considerations.
In order to estimate how the expected verification
risk changes with examination effort, we note that the
probability of Type II errors becomes
P (HncA ∩ UA(xA)) . (10)
Using the characteristics function uA(xA) as the mea-
340
Ruud and Skjetne, “Verification and examination management of complex systems”
Figure 9: Illustration of the sets of subrequirements
HcA, HncA , and how these are overlapped with
EA(xA) and UA(xA). The verification risk is
estimated by means of the intersection (red
part) of the unexamined set UA(xA) and the
set of noncompliant requirements HncA .
sure of UA(xA), we analytically calculate (10) by
P (HncA ∩ UA(xA)) ≈ pnc0,HA · uA(xA). (11)
Recalling the function Φnca (·) in (8), the proposed
measure of the verification risk as a function of exam-
ination effort is then
Ψ(x) = L · Φnca (pnc0,H ◦ u(x)), (12)
where ◦ denotes the element-wise product between the
two corresponding vectors, that is
pnc0,H ◦ u(x) =
 p
nc
0,HA
· uA(xA)
pnc0,HB · uB(xB)
...
 . (13)
As illustrated in Figure 10, this shows that the ver-
ification risk initially (with no examination x = 0
such that u(x) = (1, 1, 1, . . .)) takes the value of the
a priori estimated risk Ψ0. Then the verification risk
reduces with increased examination effort according
to the examination function u(x). If for some effort
x1 the requirement Y is completeley examined, then
u(x1) = (0, 0, 0, . . .) and Ψ(x1) = 0.
3.5 Marginal verification risk
In order to determine the effect of a specific examina-
tion effort xj , one could elaborate Ψ(x) by calculating
∂Ψ/∂xj , and use this expression for marginal verifi-
cation risk efficiency with regard to the examination
effort xj of requirements in Hj , that is
∂Ψ(x)
∂xj
= L · ∂Φ
nc
a (p
nc
0,H ◦ u)
∂uj
· ∂uj(xj)
∂xj
. (14)
Figure 10: The verification risk measure is based on the
verification loss L, the a priori estimated
state of Y , and the effect u(x) of increasing
examination effort x by the given examina-
tion methods.
For complex systems or requirements consisting of
many subrequirements (for instance related to differ-
ent subsystems or components {A,B,C . . .}), the ex-
pression ∂Ψ(x)/∂xj can be further elaborated in order
to find the marginal verification risk (also called the
Birnbaums measure (Rausand and Høyland, 2004)) for
examination of a given requirement.
Verification and examination management is now to
determine the sequence of examinations that should be
carried out among the main requirements Hj before
concluding the outcome of verification. The sequence
of examinations can be decided by selecting the require-
ments that achieve largest risk reduction in Ψ(x)/∂xj
(steepest decent) for a given examination effort xj .
3.6 Stop examination criteria
The verification management model handles verifica-
tions that potentially may contain large quantities of
effort. In order to limit the examination effort, the
model proposes a criterion for stopping the examina-
tion and concluding the verification. Two examples of
possible stop criteria are illustrated in Figure 11.
The first criterion Z1 illustrated in Figure 11 is re-
lated to the marginal change of the verification risk
function. For example, Z1 =’true’ if ∂Ψ(x)/∂xj > −1
for a given method and corresponding effort xj then the
examination should be stopped. This means that the
number −1 is an example threshold indicating when
the marginal verification risk reduction is less than or
equal to the marginal examination effort xj .
The other proposed criterion Z2 is related to the
achieved level of verification risk. For example,
Z2 =’true’ if Ψ(x) ≤ 20 000 after an effort x, where
the number 20 000 is an example threshold to be se-
lected.
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Figure 11: Examples of examination stop criteria Z1
and Z2, where Z1 dictates a stop when the
marginal value of verification risk (∂Ψ/∂x)
reduction is lower than the marginal exam-
ination effort ∂x, and Z2 dictates a stop
when the overall verification risk is below
the value 20.000.
4 Case studies
4.1 Case 1: Criteria for performing
examination of forklift
We return to the illustrating example of Section 2.2,
where a forklift shall either be accepted or rejected by
the buyer. The forklift shall be accepted if the single
requirement Y is complied with. Assume that there
is given a priori probability pc0,Y = P (Y ) that the re-
quirement Y is complied with, or pnc0,Y = P (¬Y ) that
the requirement is not complied with.
The buyer is offered the possibility to carry out ver-
ification and examination at cost x1, where this ex-
amination will clarify for certain if the requirement is
complied with or not; see Figure 3. The value of the
forklift is L. In the case that the buyer accepts the
forklift, he has to pay the value L. The verification
management question is to decide whether the exami-
nation and verification shall be carried out at an effort
of x1; see Figure 7.
In this case we have Φnca (p
nc
0,Y ) = p
nc
0,Y and
Ψ(x) = L · pnc0,Y · u(x). (15)
Let the examination stop criterion Z =’true’ be to
stop examination when the examination effort exceeds
the verification risk, that is, Z = {x1 > Ψ(x)}. Insert-
ing the expression (15) for the verification risk gives
the stop criterion
Z = Z(x) =
{
x1 > L · pnc0,Y · u(x)
}
. (16)
Assume that a priori it is a 10% probability that
the requirement Y is noncompliant, that is, pnc0,Y =
P (¬Y ) = 0.1. Initially, we then get the condition on
examination effort (x1 ≤ 0.1L) for performing the ex-
amination. This means that if the cost of performing
the examination is less than 10% of the cost L of the
machine, then the buyer should decide to perform the
examination of Y .
4.2 Case 2. Verification and examination
management of a redundant system
with one common component
Figure 12: A DP vessel is arranged with 4 trusters
and 4 diesel-generators. The A-side (port)
and B-side (starboard) consist of switch-
board SWBA and switchboard SWBB,
each with 2 connected diesel-generators and
2 thrusters, respectively. The switchboards
SWBA and SWBB are connected with a
bus-tie breaker X, labeled subsystem C.
We are given a redundant power generating and
thruster system as indicated in the block diagram in
Figure 12. The requirement to this system may be
described by
Y = (HA ∨HB) ∧HC , (17)
and by de Morgan’s theorem we get the negated re-
quirement
¬Y = (¬HA ∧ ¬HB) ∨ ¬HC . (18)
The probability that the requirement is noncompli-
ant becomes
pnc0,Y = P (¬Y ) = P ((¬HA ∧ ¬HB) ∨ ¬HC)
= P (¬HA) · P (¬HB) + P (¬HC)
− P (¬HA) · P (¬HB) · P (¬HC)
= pnc0,HAp
nc
0,HB + p
nc
0,HC − pnc0,HApnc0,HBpnc0,HC
=: Φnca (p
nc
0,H), (19)
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Figure 13: Reliability diagram of complex system (A∨
B) ∧ C. The a priori assumptions for the
compliant parts and the unexamined parts
for each subsystem (or subrequirements) are
indicated. The verification and examination
management objective is to estimate the in-
dividual xA, xB , xC examination efforts in
order to fulfill the stop criterion (Z).
where
pnc0,H =
 pnc0,HApnc0,HB
pnc0,HC
 (20)
are the a priori probabilities that respective require-
ments HA, HB , HC are not initially complied with.
Assume that the verification loss is of Type II and
this loss is represented by L, and let xA, xB , xC be the
respective examination efforts on subsystems A, B, C.
Based on the above formula for P (¬Y ) and (12) the
verification risk now becomes
Ψ(x) = L · Φnca (pnc0,H ◦ u(x)) (21)
= L · [pnc0,HAuA(xA) · pnc0,HBuB(xB) + pnc0,HCuC(xC)
− pnc0,HAuA(xA) · pnc0,HBuB(xB) · pnc0,HCuC(xC)]
where it is assumed that the examinations of the sub-
systems A, B, C are statistically independent. The
marginal verification risk (Birnbaums measure) with
regards to examination efforts can now be described
analytically by
∂Ψ
∂xA
= L · pnc0,HA
∂uA
∂xA
[
pnc0,HBuB − pnc0,HBuB · pnc0,HCuC
]
(22)
∂Ψ
∂xB
= L · pnc0,HB
∂uB
∂xB
[
pnc0,HAuA − pnc0,HAuA · pnc0,HCuC
]
(23)
∂Ψ
∂xC
= L · pnc0,HC
∂uC
∂xC
[
1− pnc0,HAuA · pnc0,HBuB
]
. (24)
The stop examination criterion Z is defined as
Z = {Ψ(x) < 50 000} , (25)
and the verification loss is L = 1000 000 (NOK). Let
the a priori assumptions of compliance (c) and non-
compliance (nc) of the requirements HA, HB , HC be
pc0,HA = 0.8, p
nc
0,HA = 0.2 (26)
pc0,HB = 0.8, p
nc
0,HB = 0.2 (27)
pc0,HC = 0.9, p
nc
0,HC = 0.1, (28)
and assume that the subsystems, requirements, and
examinations for A, B, C are statistically independent.
The examination characteristics functions are all as-
sumed expressed as
uj(xj) =
1
1 + xj
, xj ∈ [0,∞), (29)
with j = A,B,C, where xj for instance corresponds to
days of examination. This gives
∂uj
∂xj
=
−1
(1 + xj)
2 , (30)
which is inserted into the verification risk and marginal
verification risk equations for the A, B, C subsystems.
The model has been implemented in an Excel spread-
sheet, which is used for proposing the examination ef-
forts and the sequence of the efforts. Table 1 shows the
sequence of the examinations {xC , xA, xC , xB} selected
on the basis of the marginal verification risk for the re-
quirements. The examination is stopped when the ver-
ification risk is below 50 000 as {Z = 43000 < 50000}
satisfies the given stop examination criterion. At this
stage the verifier will make the verification decision ei-
ther to accept or reject the Y requirement.
When the stop criterion is reached, the result is a
proposed examination effort of xA = 1 day on the A-
system, xB = 1 day on the B-system, and xC = 2 days
on the C-system, in total 4 days of examinations.
5 Results and discussion
This paper reports the expressed original industry need
for examination and verification management as formu-
lated in 2011. In the RCN research projects “D2V”
(RCN project no. 210670) and “Arctic DP” (RCN
project no. 199567) a conceptual examination and ver-
ification management (VM/EM) model was proposed
in the years 2012-2014 and presented in this paper.
The main properties of the VM/EM model are:
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Table 1: Verification and examination management applied to find an effective sequence of examination for the
subsystems A,B,C. The table shows the proposed sequence of examination calculated from a steepest
decent approach. The red numbers illustrate the information used for selecting examination. The
resulting examination effort becomes: (xA = 1, xB = 1, xC = 2).
Step xA
∂Ψ
∂xA
xB
∂Ψ
∂xB
xC
∂Ψ
∂xC
Ψ(x)
0 0 -36000 0 -36000 0 -96000 136000
1 0 -38000 0 -38000 1 -24000 88000
2 1 -9500 0 -19000 1 -24500 69000
3 1 -9667 0 -19833 2 -10888 52666
4 1 -4833 1 -4833 2 -11000 43000
• The VM/EM method is based on a holistic top-
down approach and based on examination of com-
binations of subsystems. A top-down recursive
method to any level of detail of subsystems is pre-
sented.
• Based on possible consequences of Type II errors,
the concept of ‘verification risk’ has been proposed
as the key parameter to be reduced by means of
examination efforts. Verification risk is to be used
as the main parameter for selecting and managing
examination efforts.
• The VM/EM method establishes relations be-
tween the initial verification loss, the complex
system design topology, verification method per-
formance, and the required examination effort to
achieve the examination stop criterion.
• Establishment of u-functions for describing rela-
tion between the examined parts of a requirement
and the examination effort. An assumption made
is that different u-functions may have different
forms, and that some barriers might be more effi-
cient to examine than the others in order to reduce
the overall verification risk with lowest use of ex-
amination resources.
• The VM/EM method allows for complex system
descriptions using standard Boolean and reliabil-
ity methods, such as de Morgans theorem, Birn-
baums measure, reliability block diagrams (RBD),
event tree analysis (ETA), and fault tree analysis
(FTA).
• Requirement for an examination stop criterion to
clarify when examination should be stopped.
• The Excel implementation model is quite simple
and intuitive, although the background analytical
equations for a medium size system might be quite
large and complex.
The paper provides two simple verification manage-
ment cases based on an Excel implementation. The
cases demonstrate how the verification and examina-
tion management process of examination efforts may
work in a general and in a practical manner. In fu-
ture, the steepest decent algorithm to find the se-
quence of examinations should be implemented in an
optimization-based framework.
The model requires that the user must be more ex-
plicit on specification of the verification task to be car-
ried out, compared to a traditional planning of exami-
nation efforts. These issues are normally taken implic-
itly into consideration in the approval or verification
processes. However, in the proposed verification risk
model it is required to be more explicit on topics like:
• Potential verification consequence loss L.
• Specification of complex requirements through the
Boolean structure function Y = Φ(H).
• Examination stop criterion Z on how accurate and
how much cost or effort that should be spent on
reaching the examination result and then make the
verification decision.
The model allows for scaling up to a large number of
components and subsystems and their corresponding
requirements. This will also make it possible to se-
lect parts of the model that could be modeled in more
detail.
Examination and verification management as indi-
cated in this paper is mathematical and will produce
the same result every time. However, the initial as-
sumptions of a priori values and u-functions will be
based on various types of considerations that could re-
sult in different results from time to time.
The model seems to be robust, and the resulting dis-
tribution of examination efforts in the different subsys-
tems will probably depend on the component position
in the system topology. The design of the system topol-
ogy strongly influences the efficiency of examination
efforts in the different subsystems.
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In the approach described in this paper, the nega-
tive concept ‘verification risk’ has been chosen to be
the key concept for selecting examination efforts. In
the very beginning of this development process, the
positive concept of ‘verification benefit’ was proposed
as the key concept. However, at a certain stage the
conformity to audit risk concepts motivated the verifi-
cation risk concept, and the mathematical expressions
for verification risk was perceived to be easier to handle
in calculations than the expressions for confirmation
and benefit.
Complex systems often have a high number of sys-
tem operational modes that should be verified. Such
advanced modeling could be included in future devel-
opment of the models.
The estimation method demonstrated in this paper
is based on a manual selection method of one single
step. It is obviously possible to carry out the esti-
mation with more automatic methods and this should
be considered in the future when more basic knowledge
about the prerequisites discussed above have been elab-
orated and justified.
6 Conclusion
The main result of the work reported in this paper is
a proposal of a conceptual framework for verification
and examination management as requested by the ver-
ification industry in 2010-2011. The main requested
issue at that time was to manage how much examina-
tion and verification effort should be allocated on the
various parts of a system and how the sequence of such
efforts should be distributed on the subsystem parts.
Another important issue was to estimate the effect of
different verification and examination methods. The
main lesson learned by the work is that it is possible to
model and organize the selection of the examination ef-
fort for complex systems in the proposed manner with
the given examination and verification risk manage-
ment assumptions.
The VM/EM modeling is a simple and flexible ap-
proach that is similar to existing models for expressing
reliability and risk. An extended verification risk model
may make it possible to model a wide range of system
requirements and system topologies.
The conceptual model clarifies and specifies key con-
cepts regarding verification and examination manage-
ment. The verification risk concept also has similarities
to the audit risk method applied in planning of finan-
cial auditing.
Complex systems or operations have complex logic
relations between subsystems and subfunctions. These
relations have effects on the overall system properties
(e.g. reliability, availability, restoration time, risk, etc.)
The relations also have effects on the required exami-
nation efforts that may be needed in order to achieve
an overall goal on verification risk at system level.
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